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REcENT CASES
are not substantially lessened by restrictions on the power written in
the trust instrument, and if by allowing the deduction the trust corpus
cannot escape estate or gift taxation in her hands, then the marital
deduction should be allowed.
Glenn L. Greene, Jr.
MAsTim AND SEvANT-Luminrr OF MASTER FOR SANcnoN D HoRsE-
PLAY OF SEnvNr-Appellant had put his servant, the co-defendant, in
charge of the restaurant of which he was the owner and operator.
While the servant was in charge, he sprayed or poured inflammable
fluid used in cigarette lighters on the shirt of the plaintiff who had
dozed off at the counter. The plaintiff's shirt was set afire and he suf-
fered severe injuries as a result of the prank. Although the appellant
was not present at the time, he had in the past observed such horse-
play by his servant and had even engaged in it himself. He stated that
this was the first time any injury had occurred as a result. The trial
jury found in favor of the plaintiff and returned a verdict of $1,274.50
damages, with the provision that the appellant, proprietor, should pay
$1,200.00 of that amount. Held: affirmed. Where the proprietor of a
restaurant had observed and sanctioned horseplay of his servant and
knew or should have known that such horseplay might result in injury
to a patron, he is liable for injuries suffered by a patron as a result of
similar horseplay engaged in by his servant during his absence. This
was said by the Court to follow from the rule that when an employer
leaves one in charge of his business during his absence and that one
wrongfully does something to injure a patron, which the employer has
reason to know he may do, the employer is liable therefor. Baldwin v.
1Wiggins, 289 S.W. 2d 729 Ky. 1956).
The theory relied upon by the Court in establishing the employer's
liability is somewhat difficult to determine. If the Court means to say
that an employer is liable for anything his employee may do when he
leaves his employee in charge of his store, this is a striking new imposi-
tion of responsibility upon storeowners. Such blanket liability is not
grounded in agency. If, however, the Court means to impose such
responsibility only where the employer knew or had reason to know
of the dangerous acts of the employee, then the theory of the em-
ployer's liability is either his own independent negligence in not for-
bidding the dangerous acts or the application of. what appears to be a
new test to determine when a servant's act is within the scope of his
employment.
It is a well established principle that a master is responsible for the
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acts of his servant performed in the course of employment. This in-
cludes wilful torts of the servant resulting in injury to a third party
where such conduct can be said to have occurred in the course of his
employment.1
The master's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is
said to be derivative, i.e., the master's liability springs from the act of
another for which he is accountable under a legal doctrine. It is not
relevant that the master is free from negligence or wrongfulness. All
that is necessary to establish his liability under the doctrine is that the
servant's act occur in the course of his employment. If the injurious
act of the servant is not committed in the course of his employment,
the master cannot be held liable under respondeat superior, and, if he
is to be held accountable at all, his liability must be predicated on
some other theory. In this latter instance his liability must spring from
some negligence or wrongful conduct on his part; and in such cases
his liability is not derivative, but independent.
Whether or not an act is within the course of employment is fre-
quently dependent on vague notions of implied authorization, the
master's business interests or the master's control over the employee
in the performance of the act. The tests accepted vary according to
the jurisdiction. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has advanced several
criteria, e.g.: (1) if the act causing the injury was in the line of the
servant's duty;2 (2) if the act was done in execution of the master's
authority, or within the scope of the authority conferred on the servant
by the master;3 (8) if the act was within the real or apparent pursu-
ance of the master's business;4 (4) if the act was part of the work for
which the servant was employed.5
Of particular concern in our principal case is whether or not pranks,
practical jokes or horseplay of a servant can be said to be acts occur-
ring in the course of employment. More specifically, can sanctioned
horseplay, i.e., horseplay which the master has observed previously
or of which he has had notice, and, by not objecting to, impliedly ap-
proved of, be said to be to have been impliedly authorized, and hence,
to fall within the course of a servant's employment so as to render a
1 Son v. Hartford Ice Cream Co., 102 Conn. 696, 129 Ad 778 (1925); Carr
v. Crowell, 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P 2d 5 (1946); Dilli v. Johnson, 107 F 2d 669
(1939); Plotkin v. Northland Transp. Co., 204 Minn. 422, 283 NW 758 (1939),
noted in 23 Minn. L. Rev. 981; Guipe v. Jones, 320 Mich. 1, 30 NW 2d 408(1948); Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal. 2d 834, 180 P 2d 684, 172 A.L.R. 525 (1947),
noted in 28 Ore. L. Rev. 83.
2 Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Rue, 142 Ky. 694, 134 SW 1144 (1911).3 John v. Lococo, 256 Ky. 607, 76 SW 2d 897 (1934).
4 General Refractories Co. v. Mozier, 235 Ky. 252, 30 SW 2d 952 (1930).
5 Founier v. Churchill Downs-Latonia, 292 Ky. 215, 166 SW 2d 88 (1942).
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master liable for injuries resulting from such conduct under the prin-
ciple of respondeat superior?
In Bauman'& Adnr v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,6 re-
ferred to in the principal case,'7 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held
that where the employer had no notice of the dangerous horseplay or
pranks of his servants, he was not liable for injuries to other non-
participating employees resulting therefrom. The clear implication of
the decision was that horseplay was not within the course of a servants
employment.
The Court distinguished the Bauman decision in the principal case
by saying that the master had had notice of the dangerous horseplay
of his servant and in fact had even engaged in it previously himself.8
Thus, the Court concluded, the master had impliedly sanctioned the
horseplay and thereby brought it within the course of the servants
employment. This conclusion of the Court is noteworthy in two re-
spects. First, it introduces another test for determining when a serv-
ants act is within the course of employment, i.e., when it has been im-
pliedly sanctioned by the employer. The act of the servant under this
test, apparently, need have no relation whatever to his employment
or to his master's interests, so long as it has been at least impliedly
sanctioned. In fact the act may even be detrimental to the employer's
interest. just how extensive this test is meant to be has yet to be seen.
Second, it seems to represent a departure from the concept of
respondeat superior as it has been thought of in the past.9 Under the
doctrine heretofore, the act of the servant had to be a part of or con-
nected in some way to his employment. While one test frequently
used to determine if an act is part of one's employment is to determine
whether or not the servant was authorized to so act, it does not appear
that the conduct of a servant which has been impliedly sanctioned only
that is, permitted or allowed rather than authorized was enough to
bring it within the course of one's employment. 10
6305 Ky. 344, 204 SW 2d 327 (1947).
7 239 SW 2d at 730.
8 ibid.
9 Mechem, Outlines of Agency sec. 402 (4th ed. 1952).1040 A.L.R. 1333 (1926). In 114 A.L.R. 1033 (1938), an annotation on
the topic of the liability of an employer other than a carrier for a personal assault
by an employee upon a patron, the following is said (114 A.L.R. at 1033):
"The majority of the well-reasoned decisions pointing out the farthest boun-
daries of the doctrine of respondeat superior have proceeded in accordance
with the rule stated by Cooley, J., at an early stage in the development of
modem views as to the liability of a master for the torts of his servant: 'The
Liability of the master for intentional acts which constitute legal wrongs can
only arise when that which is done is within the real or apparent scope of the
master's business. It does not arise where the servant has stepped aside from
his employment to commit a tort which the master neither directed in fact,
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The Court carefully chose to describe the defendant employer's
liability in the principal case as "purely derivative" and "dependent
solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior"."- It could as well
have based the employer's liability on a theory of independent negli-
gence, i.e., his having allowed his servants to engage in practices he
knew might cause injury to patrons. There is ample authority for such
a holding.12 This perhaps would be the more logical result since the
distinguishing factor between the Bauman case and the principal case
is that in the latter, the employer had notice of the dangerous horse-
play and failed to act. His failure to keep his premises safe for his
patrons is a breach of his duty to his patrons and the real reason for his
liability.
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nor could be supposed, from the nature of his employment, to have authorized
or expected the servant to do. . . . The test of the master's responsibility is
not the motive of the servant, but whether that which he did was something
his employment contemplated, and something which, if he should do law-
fully, he might do in the employer's name."
"1 289 SW 2d at 731.
2The liability of a master who permits or encourages its employees to engage
in dangerous practices on the master's premises during their noon hour to a
servant injured by such dangerous practice is treated in 40 A.L.R. 1333 (1926).
The general rule is recognized as that established in Grifln v. Baltimore & 0. R.
Co., 96 W. Va. 302, 122 SE 912 (1924) that such a negligent master is liable to
the injured servant. The annotator is vague as to the theory upon which the
master's liability is based. But turning to the Griffin case, the West Virginia Courtstates, the basis of liability clearly (122 SE at 913):
" It is insisted by counsel for defendant that the employee who is alleged tohave thrown the stone injuring plaintiff was not acting within the scope of
his employment or in the furtherance of the master's business at the time of
the accident, but that he had departed therefrom and that therefore the
master is not answerable for his act. The negligence here alleged is not that
of a fellow servant, but the negligence of the master, in that it permitted,
encouraged and participated in dangerous acts of the same character as that
which caused plaintiff's injury, and in the particular act complained of, and
on its own premises surrounded plaintiff with dangers".
The West Virginia Court pointed to the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Fletcher v. Balto. & Pot. R. Co., 168 U.S. 135, 42 L. Ed. 411 (1897),
wherein it is said (168 U.S. at 139):
"If the act on the car were such as to permit the jury to find that it was
one from which, as a result, injury to a person on the street might reasonably
be feared, and if acts of a like nature had been and were habitually per-
formed by those upon the car to the knowledge of the agents or servants of
the defendant, who with such knowledge permitted their continuance, then
in such case the jury might find the defendant guilty of negligence in having
permitted the act and liable for the injury resulting therefrom, notwithstand-
ing the act was that of an employee and beyond the scope of his employment
and totally disconnected therewith. . . . It is not a question of scope of
employment or that the act of the individual is performed by one who has
ceased for the time being to be in the employment of the company".
